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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(i)

Nature of the Case:

This is a land use case involving the payment of impact fees.

Appellants Buckskin

Properties, Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC (collectively "Buckskin") undertook a multiphase development called The Meadows at West Mountain ("The Meadows") located in Valley
County, Idaho.

After paying the impact fee on three out of six phases of the development,

Buckskin filed this lawsuit seeking a declaration that the payment of impact fees violated state
law because Valley County did not follow the requirements of state law for collecting impact
fees. The district court dismissed Buckskin's Complaint on summary judgment on grounds that
all of Buckskin's claims were barred by the four-year statute of limitations for bringing an
inverse condemnation claim.
(ii)

Course of Proceedings:

Buckskin filed its initial Complaint against Valley County on December 1, 2009. R. Vol.
I, p. 1. Buckskin's Complaint included two counts requesting a declaratory judgment that Valley
County's collection of impact fees is in violation ofIdaho law and for inverse condemnation. Id.
Valley County answered on December 21,2009. R. Vol. I, p. 9. Valley County filed its Motion
for Summary Judgment on October 14, 2010 arguing that Buckskin's Complaint must be
dismissed based on the running of the statute of limitations for inverse condemnation claims,
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, ripeness, and allegations that Buckskin's payment of
the impact fee was voluntary. R. Vol. I, p. 35. Buckskin filed its Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Summary Judgment on November 2,2010. After oral argument on Valley County's
motion, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment granting summary judgment to Valley County on January 7, 2011. R. Vol.
III, p. 486.
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The district court dismissed Buckskin's inverse condemnation claim on the basis that the
four-year statute of limitation accrued when payment of the impact fee was made on Phase 1 of
The Meadows, which was more than four years from the filing of Buckskin's Complaint. Jd.
The district court also held, however, that Valley County acted outside the scope of its legal
authority to collect an impact fee. Jd. Based on the district court's Memorandum Decision,
Buckskin filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on January 10, 2011, seeking a
declaration from the district court on Count I of the Complaint that Buckskin was not required to
pay an impact fee. R. Vol. III, p. 494. Valley County filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment on
January 13,2011. R. Vol. III, p. 498. The following day, on January 14,2011, Buckskin filed
an opposition to the Motion for Entry of Judgment arguing that the district court's Memorandum
Decision did not dispose of Buckskin's claim for a declaratory ruling that it did not have to pay
impact fees for Phases 4,5, and 6 of The Meadows.
Shortly thereafter Buckskin then filed a Motion for Reconsideration!Amendment and
supporting memorandum on January 21, 2001. R. Vol. III, p. 513, 515-22. The Motion for
Reconsideration!Amendment repeated the arguments on Buckskin's opposition to entry of
judgment, that Buckskin's claim for inverse condemnation on Phases 2 and 3 of The Meadows
was timely because they were separate takings with separate accrual dates, and because the fiveyear statute of limitations for disputes arising from a written agreement applies in this case.
On March 7, 2011, the Valley County Board of County Commissioners adopted
Resolution 11-6, which purports to place a moratorium on aspects of Valley County's impact fee
practices. R. Vol. III, p. 55l. Two days after adopting Resolution 11-6, on March 9, 2011,
Valley County filed its brief replying to Buckskin's objections to the Motion for Entry of
Judgment, arguing, in part, that Resolution 11-6 mooted Buckskin's objections to the entry of
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judgment. R. Vol. III, pp. 540, 548, Ex. 1. The district court then conducted a hearing on these
matters two days later, on March 11,2011.
The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision Re: (1) Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment; (2) Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment; and (3) Plaintiffs Motion
to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees on April 11, 2011, denying Buckskin's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration!Amendment, and granting the Motion for
Entry of Judgment and granting, in part, the Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and costs. R.
Vol. III, p. 577. The District Court entered its Judgment on April 19, 2011, in favor of Valley
County dismissing all of Buckskin's claims against Valley County with prejudice, and ordering
Buckskin to pay costs to Valley County in the amount of $666. R. Vol. III, p. 596. Thereafter,
Buckskin filed its Notice of Appeal to this Court on May 26, 2011. R. Vol. III, p. 599. Valley
County filed Notice of its Cross Appeal on June 15,2011. R. Vol. III, p. 605.

(iii)

Statement of Facts:

Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIFA"):
The Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIFA"), I.C. § 67-8201 et seq., is the
enabling statute that sets forth all of the necessary prerequisites for a local government entity to
collect an impact fee.

An impact fee is:

"a payment of money imposed as a condition of

development approval to pay for a proportionate share of the cost of system improvements
needed to serve development." I.C. § 67-8203(9). The purpose of IDIFA is to promote orderly
growth and development by establishing uniform procedures for local governments to require
developers the payment of impact fees and to establish minimum standards for the
implementation of impact fee ordinances. I.C. § 67-8202.

The payment of an impact fee is

usually established during the land use application process as a "development requirement."
IDIF A defines "development requirement" as:
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· .. a requirement attached to a developmental approval or other governmental action
approving or authorizing a particular development project including, but not limited
to, a rezoning, which requirement compels the payment, dedication or contribution of
goods, services, land, or money as a condition of approval.
LC. § 67-8203(10) (underlining added).
IDIF A indicates that "Governmental entities which comply with the requirements of this
chapter may impose by ordinance development impact fees as a condition of development
approval on all developments." I.C. § 67-8204 (underlining added). Hence, failure to follow
IDIF A precludes a governmental entity from collecting an impact fee and/or conditioning a land
use approval upon the payment of an impact fee.
Valley County's Local Land Use Development Ordinance:
Valley County's ordinance containing the regulations and standard of review procedures
for zoning and subdivision applications is called the Valley County Land Use and Development
Ordinance ("LUDO"). The LUDO contains the rules and procedures for all land use applications
in Valley County. Appendix C to the 2004 LUDO contains the requirements for Planned Unit
Development Applications. One of the requirements under the LUDO is the payment of impact
fees. It states, in relevant part:
I.

DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT

Because of the uniqueness of each proposal a PUD may impact county services
and/or property which may be mitigated through a Development Agreement.
Compensation for these impacts shall be negotiated in work sessions with
appropriate county entities and a Development Agreement shall be entered into
between the applicant and the county through the Board as additional conditions
considered for approval of a PUD.
J.

IMPACT FEES

The Commission may recommend to the Board impact fees as authorized by
Idaho Code Section 31-870 for any PUD proposal. The Board may implement the
impact fees as recommended by the Commission or as it deems necessary for the
proposal.
R. Vol. II, p. 298 (emphasis added).
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Valley County's Capital Improvements Program:
Valley County has also implemented a program it calls a Capital Improvements Program
("CIP") for new development in the County.

Affidavit of Victor S. Villegas in Support of

Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon
Cruickshank), p. 36, l. 17 - p. 37, 1. 8. 1 Under that program, Valley County identified different
areas throughout the county to determine the level of road improvements necessary for the roads
in that area to handle the increases in traffic as a result of the development. fd. Valley County
identified approximately 15 to 20 CIP areas throughout the County. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A
(deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 39, l. 2-11. Under the CIP, road impact fees are to be
paid pursuant to a contract called a Road Development Agreement ("RDA") between the
developer and Valley County. Importantly, the CIP is not part of the LUDO and is not an
ordinance or law.
A description of Valley County's CIP can be found in the public records such as Valley
County's March, 2008 Master Transportation Plan. The Transportation Plan describes the CIP
as:

E.

Capital Improvement Program Process and Purpose

Valley County has developed and adopted a Capital Improvement Program (CIP).
The following description of the CIP is provided by Valley County:
In 2005, the Valley County Commissioners initiated a Road Development
Agreement (RDA) process to require new developments to pay a fee to
mitigate the impacts of their developments on the roads and bridges in Valley
County. The RDA process replaced the Capital Contribution Agreements that
were used by Valley County for larger developments that needed infrastructure
improvements. The RDA requires all developers to pay a fee based on the
number of trips their developments generate. Developers are, in effect, required
to pay for the roadway capacity their developments use. The fee must be
paid at the time of final plat. Credit is given for ROW [right-of-way] required
I The Affidavit of Victor Villegas in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment was sent to
the Clerk of the Supreme Court as an Exhibit to the Clerk's Record and will be subsequently referred to as the
"Villegas Affidavit."
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from the development and any in-lieu-of contributions, such as construction
materials or developer sponsored construction of portions of roads and bridges.
Villegas Affidavit, Ex. E (emphasis added).
The CIP requires that developers pay a fee, construct in-kind improvements on existing
roadways or dedicate rights-of-way in an amount calculated by the County's engineer to deal
with impacts on county roads. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at
p. 41, 1. 7 - p. 42, l. 18. The CIP, and calculations as to road impacts allegedly caused by new
development, was completed by Valley County and its engineer sometime between 2000 and
2005. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 43, 1. 6 - p. 45, 1. 11.
Valley County did not bother to follow IDIF A and the enabling process required under
IDIFA to exact road impact fees from developers.

This is true even though Valley County

officials understood that they were requiring developers to pay to mitigate the impacts of
development.

Villegas Affidavit, Ex. B (deposition of Phillip Davis) at p. 59, 11. 16-24.

Planning and Zoning officials just assumed that the RDA scheme was lawful under the Local
Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA"), which allows for development agreements for zoning
changes. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. C (deposition of Cynda Herrick) at p 112, 1. 22 - p. 113,1. 5, p.
121,11. 12-17.
The CIP was implemented, after due discussion between the Valley County
Commissioners, the Valley County Planning and Zoning Commission and the Valley County
Road Department Supervisor. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at
p. 45, 1. 12 - p. 48, 1. 15.) The Valley County Commissioners directed the Valley County
Planning and Zoning Commission to begin placing a condition to final approval of developments
upon developers to enter into a RDA with the County to pay for impacts on County roads based
on the CIP and calculations arrived by the County and its engineers. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A
(deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 45, 1. 18 - p. 50, 1. 5; Villegas Affidavit, Ex. B
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 6

(deposition of Phillip Davis) at p. 110,1. 1 - p. 111,1. 25.; R. Vol. I, p. 130,

~

3. As a result, the

Planning and Zoning Department began conditioning final plat approval on developers entering
into an agreement with the County to pay for road impacts. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition
of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 49, 11. 12-17; Villegas Affidavit, Ex. C (deposition of Cynda
Herrick) at p. 59,11. 13-19, p. 65, 1. 12 - p. 66, 1. 1, p. 68, 11. 2-10; R. Vol. I, p. 130, ,-r 3.
Buckskin's Land Use Application:
Buckskin submitted a land use application to Valley County on or about March 29,2004
seeking to develop The Meadows, a multi-phase development project consisting of at least six
phases. R. Vol. II, p. 280, ,-r 9; Affidavit of Cynda Herrick in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exs. 3, 4?

The application was for a Planned Unit Development ("PUD"),

Conditional Use Permit ("CUP"), Preliminary Plat and Final Plat for Phase 1 of The Meadows.
Id.

As part of the application, Buckskin attached two proposed agreements, a "development
agreement" and a "capital contribution agreement." R. Vol. II, p. 280, ,-r,-r 3-8; Herrick Affidavit,
Ex. 3.

Buckskin submitted these proposed agreements with its application because Valley

County's LUDO required that Buckskin, as the applicant for a PUD, enter into a development
agreement. R. Vol. II, p. 280, ,-r,-r 3-8. The idea to enter into a development agreement or pay an
impact fee was not Buckskin's, but rather it was required under Valley County's LUDO and
policies.
The CIP area for The Meadows is the West Roseberry Area. R. Vol. II, p. 280, ,-r 14, Ex.
G. For Phase 1 of The Meadows the impact fee was calculated by Valley County's engineer
pursuant to a traffic impact study he conducted for the development of the Tamarack Resort. R.
Vol. II, p. 280, ,-r 5; R. Vol. I, p. 130, ,-r,-r 4-5, Exs. A, B. According to the engineer's traffic
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impact study and his calculations, an impact fee of approximately $1,800.00 per residential unit
was necessary to account for impacts of new development on the roadways located in the West
Roseberry CIP area. R. Vol. II, p. 280,

~~

5-7; R. Vol. I, p. 130, ~~ 4-5, Exs. A, B. This amount

and the fact that Valley County planned to require that all developers enter into an agreement
with Valley County to pay the impact fee as a condition to approval of a land use application was
determined before Buckskin filed its application. R. Vol. I, p. 130, ~~ 4-5, Exs. A, B.
Buckskin's proposed "capital contribution agreement" attached to its application
identified the payment of an impact fee as required by the LUDO. R. Vol. II, p. 280,
Herick Affidavit, Ex. 3 (Appendix C).

~~

6-8;

Buckskin and Valley County never entered into the

proposed "development agreement" attached to Buckskin's application.
Valley County required that Buckskin sign a Capital Contribution Agreement that was
different than the agreement proposed in its application. Valley County's Capital Contribution
Agreement for Phase 1 of The Meadows contained terms relating only to the payment of impact
fees and nothing more. R. Vol. II, p. 280,

~

11, p. 334. The impact fee was calculated by Valley

County's Engineer as $1,844 per lot. R. Vol. II, p. 338. According to the terms of the Capital
Contribution Agreement for Phase 1 of The Meadows, Buckskin was required to pay impact fees
in the form ofa dedication of right-of-way in a total amount equal to or greater than $91,142.00.
R. Vol. II, p. 335. A credit for impact fees under future phases was granted to Buckskin for the

amount the dedicated right-of-way exceeded the impact fee for Phase 1 of The Meadows.
Buckskin likewise was required to pay an impact fee for Phases 2 and 3 of The Meadows
when it applied for Final Plat approval of these phases. R. Vol. II, p. 280,

~~

12-13. On or about

September 26,2005, Buckskin entered into another contract, this time titled "Road Development

The Affidavit ofCynda Herrick in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment was sent to the Clerk of the Idaho
Supreme Court as an exhibit to the Clerk's Record and will be subsequently referred to as the "Herrick Affidavit."
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Agreement," for the payment of impact fees in order to receive Final Plat approval for Phases 2
and 3 of The Meadows. R. Vol. II, p. 344.
Under the RDA, Buckskin was assessed an impact fee of $247,096 and after the deducting
$14,936 in credits, Buckskin paid $232,160 to Valley County. R. Vol. II, p. 344; R. Vol. II, p.
254. The per lot impact fee assessment for Phases 2 and 3 was also calculated at $1,844 by
Valley County's Engineer. R. Vol. II, p. 344. The RDA for Phases 2 and 3 also was not
negotiated or discussed prior to Valley County conditioning final plat approval on entering into
the agreement. Jd.; R. Vol. II, p. 280,

~

13.

Buckskin prepared to get final plat approval to develop Phases 4 through 6 of The
Meadows on or around August 2007. R. Vol. II, p. 280,
III, p. 255,

~~

~

14; R. Vol. II, p. 249,

~~

6-8; R. Vol.

4-5. Based on Valley County's impact fee, as calculated by Valley County's

Engineer under the West Roseberry Area 2007 Roadway Capital Improvement Program, the fee
was unilaterally and arbitrarily increased from $1,844.00 per building lot to $3,968.00 per
building lot. Vol. II, p. 280,

~

14, Ex. G. This increase was both startling and unanticipated. As

a result of the increase, Buckskin representatives scheduled a meeting with the Valley County
Road Superintendent to discuss the RDA and the increase in the fee. R. Vol. II, p. 255,
R. Vol. II, p. 249,

~

6-7; R. Vol. II, p. 280,

~~

~~

4-5;

15-16.

At this meeting the Road Superintendent informed the Buckskin representatives that they
had to enter into a RDA and that they had to pay the fee in full to get final plat. Vol. II, p. 249,
~~

6-7; R. Vol. II, p. 255,

~~

4-5; R. Vol. II, p. 280,

~~

15-16. When questioned about the impact

fee and why it more than tripled from Phases 2 and 3, the Road Superintendent told the Buckskin
representatives that he hoped someone would take Valley County to court to figure out if the
RDA's and the impact fees required under the agreements were legal. R. Vol. II, p. 255,
R. Vol. II., p. 249, ~~ 6-7; R. Vol. II, p. 280, ~~ 15-16.
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~~

4-5;

Despite Valley County's defense that the payment of impact fees was voluntary,
Buckskin's experience was similar or the same as all other developers. Valley County required
developers to enter into a RDA regardless of the size of the development, including a one-lot
subdivision. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 70,1. 25 - p. 71,
1. 5. Valley County unilaterally determined the impact fee for each of the CIP areas. Villegas
Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 71,11. 6-25. As the projects neared
the point where approval of a final plat was necessary, developers generally paid a visit to the
Valley County Road Department to discuss the RDA and how it would be implemented.
Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 49, 1. 12 - p. 50, 1. 5.
The actual RDA was prepared by Valley County and its engineer; when the agreement
was finalized, it was sent to the County Commissioners for approval. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A
(deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 50,1. 6 - p. 52,1. 6. The RDA also had to be signed by
the developer and the impact fee paid before the developer could get on the agenda for the Board
of County Commissioners to consider the developer's Final Plat. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A
(deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 106, 1. 23

p. 109, 1. 9. This process of finalizing the

RDA and identifying the impact fee the developer was required to pay under the agreement
usually happened well after the initial approval of the application for a CUP. Villegas Affidavit,
Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 117, 1. 8 - p. 119, 1. 24.
Other than the amount of the fee paid under the RDA, the wording of the agreements
generally did not vary from developer to developer. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of
Gordon Cruickshank) at p. 125,11.2-7; See also R. Vol. 1, p. 123; R. Vol. I, p. 169; R. Vol. I, p.
178; R. Vol. I, p. 181; R. Vol. I, p. 194; R. Vol. I, p. 204; R. Vol. I, p. 221; R. Vol. II, p. 273; R.
Vol. II, p. 334; R. Vol. II, p. 344; R. Vol. II, p. 394; R. Vol. II, p. 404. Developers, however, did
not know the contents of or the terms and conditions of a RDA when their CUP was approved
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with the condition that they enter into a RDA. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. C (deposition of Cynda
Herrick) at p. 83,1. 24 - p. 84,1. 16. Unquestionably, signing the RDA and paying the required
fee under the agreement, however, was a required condition to obtaining Final Plat approval and
authorization to begin construction. Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A (deposition of Gordon
Cruickshank) at p. 137, 1. 6 - p. 138, 1. 21; Villegas Affidavit, Ex. C (deposition of Cynda
Herrick) at p. 101, 1. 23 - p. 102,1. 3, p. 107,1. 10 - p. 109, 1. 9, p. 104, 1. 2-18; Villegas
Affidavit, Ex. B (deposition of Phillip Davis) at p. 65,1. 16 - p. 68,1. 2.
More than a year after Buckskin initiated this litigation, the Board of County
Commissioners of Valley County, on March 7, 2011, approved Resolution 11-6. R. Vol. III, p.
551.

This resolution purports to place a moratorium on Valley County's CIP and RDA

requirement. Id. The resolution was adopted four days before a hearing on these matters. Based
on Resolution 11-6, Valley County argued that Buckskin's claims were also moot. The district
court agreed. R. Vol. III, p. 596.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

When does an inverse condemnation action accrue for fees paid on a multi-phase
development project?

B.

Should this Court apply a standard similar to the "project completion rule" for the
purpose of accrual of the statute of limitations in an inverse condemnation case
involving a multi-phase development project?

C.

Did the district court err in holding Resolution 11-6 mooted Appellant Buckskin's
request for declaratory relief?

D.

Did the district court err in dismissing Appellant Buckskin's illegal fee/tax claim on
summary judgment?

E.

Did the district court err in refusing to apply the five-year statute of limitations in
this case to a claim based upon a written instrument?

F.

Is Appellant Buckskin entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal?
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ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of Review.
This Court employs the same standard as the district court in ruling on a motion for

summary judgment. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135, 138, 983 P.2d
208 (1999). Summary judgment is appropriate only when all of the evidence establishes that
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter oflaw. I.R.c.P. 56(c); Willie v. Board of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133,59 P.3d 302,305
(2002). The Court should liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party. Id. The non-moving party must set forth genuine issues of material fact
by affidavit or otherwise. I.R.C.P.56(e). Regarding constitutional claims or the interpretation
and application of a legislative act, this Court independently determines whether the facts
support a violation. Willie at 133, 59 P.3d at 305.; Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423,427, 80
P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003).
II.

When does an inverse condemnation action accrue for fees paid on a multi-phase
development project?
Appellant, Buckskin filed this lawsuit seeking in part, to recover monies it paid to the

County under its Capital Improvements Program for Phases 2 and 3. Specifically, Buckskin paid
$232,160 in road mitigation fees to the County in order to get final plat for Phases 2 and 3 of The
Meadows Subdivision. R. Vol. II, p. 344; R. Vol. II, p. 254. One of the theories for recovery
raised by Buckskin was inverse condemnation; Buckskin asked that it be paid "just
compensation" for the fees paid on Phases 2 and 3.
Buckskin contends that the district court erred in dismissing its inverse condemnation
claim for the Phase 2 and 3 impact fee payments because: (a) the justiciability requirement of
ripeness requires that each payment should have been considered a separate taking with separate
accrual dates; (b) the district court improperly expanded the test for determining the accrual of an
APPELLANTS' BRlEF -12

inverse condemnation claim; and (c) public policy considerations support a finding that separate
takings with separate accrual dates occurred in this case with each payment of impact fees.

A.

Ripeness considerations favor a finding of separate takings.

The district court's holding fails to consider issues of justiciability and is in direct conflict
with this Court's requirement that a claim must be ripe before it can be adjudicated. Ripeness is
a fundamental prerequisite to invoke a Court's jurisdiction-a harm must be sufficiently matured
to warrant judicial intervention.

Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 936, 155 P.3d 1166,

1175 (2007) (citing Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217,1220 (2002)).

The

central concern of the ripeness doctrine is whether the case involves uncertain or contingent
future events that mayor may not occur as anticipated or, indeed, may not occur at all. See
Lewis v. Cant'! Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 479-80, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). In
other words, ripeness relates to the timing of a suit and asks whether a case is brought too early.
State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342, 127 P.3d 954, 958 (2005).

In this case, Buckskin was required to pay an impact fee for each phase as each phase
carne up for final plat. In dismissing Buckskin's inverse condemnation claim on the four year
statute of limitations, the district court held that since The Meadows development was covered
under one Conditional Use Permit, all future phases were subject to that specific accrual date.
R. Vol. III, p. 583.
The district court's reliance on the fact that Buckskin's project was approved under one
conditional use permit for the entire project demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of
multi-phase development.

The Meadows is a multi-phase mixed use development.

Vitally

important to Buckskin's inverse condemnation claim is that each and every phase of a multiphase development requires a separate approval of Final Plat by the County Commissioners. See

I.e.

§ 67-6504 (the governing board only, not a planning and zoning commission, has full

APPELLANTS' BRlEF - 13

authority to "finally approve land subdivisions"). Valley County's LUDO outlines the process
for obtaining PUD approvals, each of which is approved separately starting with Concept
Approval and ending with Final Plat approval for each phase in a multi-phase development. See
R. Vol. II, p. 290. Just because Final Plat of one phase is approved does not guarantee or mean

that future phases will receive Final Plat approval.
The district court's holding is in error because it flies in the face of the doctrine of
rIpeness.

When the impact fees were paid on Phase 1 no other payments were made and

therefore no other takings had occurred. Had Buckskin sued for "just compensation" for all
future fees it had yet to pay, that lawsuit would have been dismissed because the claims would
not have been ripe. This Court has held that a party cannot maintain an inverse condemnation
action unless there has actually been a taking of property. KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138
Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 56,60 (2003) (citing COVington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777,53
P.3d 828 (2002)). Even when a fee payer knows in advance that a fee will be collected it has not
ripened enough to bring an inverse condemnation lawsuit. Thus, the district court's reasoning
that Buckskin knew it would have to pay impact fees on future phases is irrelevant.
The only way for Buckskin to be receive "just compensation" for impact fee payments
paid on later phases without running afoul of the doctrine of ripeness is to find that each impact
fee assessment triggers a new and separate accrual period.
B.

There Was No Substantial Interference with Buckskin's Property Interest
In the Money Paid for Phases 2 and 3 When It Dedicated Real Property
For Right Of Way As Payment For Phase 1.

A second reason for finding that Buckskin's impact fee payments on Phases 2 and 3
should be treated as separate takings-and hence separate accrual dates-is the fact that there was
no substantial interference with Buckskin's money paid for Phases 2 and 3 when it paid the
impact fee for Phase 1 by giving right of way.
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This Court has held that the test for determining when an inverse condemnation action
accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations "is to be fixed at the point in time at which the
impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs'
property interest, became apparent." Tibbs v. City a/Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667,671,603 P.2d
1001, 1005 (1979) (underlining added). The district court relied on the above quoted rule oflaw
to fix the accrual date for all of Buckskin's phases at the time payment was made on Phase 1,
reasoning that: "[i]t is irrelevant that the project was divided into separate phases because the
entire project was governed by a single Conditional Use Permit and [Buckskin] had no reason to
believe that the later phases of the project would not be subject to the same impact fees as the
earlier phases of the project." R. Vol. III, p. 583.

The district court's reasoning however

impermissibly expands the rule in Tibbs to require that a property owner need only be aware that
a taking is likely to occur. Merely being aware that a taking of one's property is imminent does
not rise to the level of "substantial interference" nor is it sufficient to start the clock on the statute
of limitations.
The facts are undisputed that Buckskin paid impact fees on Phase 1 in the form of giving
real property for right-of-way. R. Vol. II, p. 280,

~

11; R. Vol. II, p. 334. When Buckskin gave

real property to Valley County it cannot be said that there was also a "substantial interference"
with Buckskin's property interest in its money that would be eventually paid on later phases.
The money remained in Buckskin's bank account. Buckskin was free to do whatever it wanted
to do with its money, and in fact, if it chose not to complete the project, it had no obligation to
pay the impact fee. Whether The Meadows was governed by a single CUP is not a controlling
factor.

Rather, the separate impact fee payments made as each phase comes for final plat

approval should be the trigger for accrual because that is when there is a substantial interference
with Buckskin's money. See also, Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 88-89, 730 P.2d
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1005, 1008-09 (1986) (holding "we have never held that a statute of limitations may run before
an aggrieved party suffers damages.").
C.

Public policy considerations favor a finding of separate takings hence
separate accrual dates.

Public policy concerns and the interest of justice favor a holding from this Court that
each impact fee assessment for the various phases starts a separate accrual date because to hold
otherwise would lead to an unconscionable result.

The district court's decision allows a

governmental entity to increase the amount of an unauthorized fee on multi-phase projects with
no fear of recourse if the statute of limitations is allowed to run once the first impact fee is paid.
Here, there is no dispute that The Meadows is a multi-phase project. R. Vol. II, p. 280,

~

3; Herrick Affidavit, Ex. 3. More importantly, the fact that final plat has not been recorded for
the final phases of The Meadows demonstrates that completion of a multi-phase project mayor
will take longer than four years. Those facts coupled with the fact that Valley County has now
increased the impact fee assessment to more than two times per lot for the final phases of The
Meadows shows how the district court's holding produces an unconscionable result.
When Buckskin executed the RDA for Phases 2 and 3 the impact fee assessment was
$1,844 per single family lot and $1,383 per apartment dwelling unit. R. Vol. II, p. 344, 349.
According to Valley County's West Roseberry Area 2007 Capital Improvement Program Cost
Estimate, the impact fee for a residential lot has now more than doubled to $3,968 per lot. R.
Vol. II, p. 350. Therefore, under the district court's holding, since Buckskin's cause of action for
all phases accrued at the payment of Phase 1 fees, Valley County is now free to unilaterally raise
the amount because Buckskin is barred from bringing an inverse condemnation action for
subsequent payments. This unconscionable result should not be allowed to stand and the only
way to avoid that result is to treat each assessment as a separate taking.
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III.

Should this Court apply a standard similar to the "project completion rule" for the
purpose of accrual of the statute of limitations in an inverse condemnation case
involving a multi-phase development project?
If this Court disagrees with Buckskin that each impact fee assessment should be treated

as a separate taking, Buckskin argues, in the alternative, that this Court should hold that the
statute of limitations has not accrued. Specifically, Buckskin asks this Court to apply a standard
similar to the "project completion rule" established by this Court in C&G, Inc. v. Canyon

Highway District No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003) and apply it to multi-phase projects.
Unless and until all impact fees are paid and Final Plat is approved on the very last phase, the
statute of limitations cannot accrue.
Generally, the standard test for determining when an inverse condemnation action
accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations "is to be fixed at the point in time at which the
impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs'
property interest, became apparent." Tibbs v. City oj Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d
1001, 1005 (1979). However, this Court has departed from the Tibbs standard the facts and
circumstances of a case and public policy required application of a different standard.
In C&G Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003) this
Court departed from the Tibbs rule holding that where government takes property by way of a
construction project, the property owner has the "right to wait until completion of the project
before his or her inverse condemnation claim accrues for purposes of calculating the statute of
limitations." Id. at 144.

That rule has been referred to by this Court as the "construction

completion rule."
In C&G the Canyon Highway District rebuilt a road over C&G's property. Id. at 141.
The Highway District believed it owned an easement over the section line and could rebuild the
road without compensating C&G for taking the property on which the road would be built. Id.
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The Highway District advised C&G that due to its alleged easement, C&G was not entitled to
compensation for a taking of its property.

Id.

C&G believed the Highway District's

representations without further inquiry. Id.
By November 1992 the Highway District completed construction of the road's subbase
and construction was totally finished by November 1993. ld. at 142, 75 P.3d at 196. In January
1997, when C&G hired a surveyor for development purposes, it learned for the first time there
was no easement over the section line. Id.

C&G initiated an inverse condemnation action

against the Highway District on January 31, 1997. Id. C&G prevailed before the district court
and the Highway District appealed on grounds that the four year statute of limitations barred
C&G's lawsuit. Id.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to apply the Tibbs standard on the issue of
accrual and instead applied the "project completion rule."

In doing so, this Court adopted its

reasoning in Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981) (project completion rule
applied to when notice provisions of Idaho Tort Claims Act is triggered) and found that there is
no reliable method to determine the extent of damages when property is taken through a
construction project until the construction project is completed. Id. at 144-145. Furthermore,
this Court held that ripeness considerations favored departure from the Tibbs standard because a
"landowner subjected to the taking of his or her property by a government construction project
should not be required to prematurely bring an inverse condemnation claim before damages can
be fully assessed." Id.
In addition to ripeness and speculative damages concerns, the C&G Court looked at other
policy considerations to justify its holding.

One interesting consideration was this Court's

recognition that C&G's claim should also not be barred gIVen the Highway District's
misrepresentation to C&G that it had an easement over their property:
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Furthermore, the Highway District's erroneous belief it had an easement over the
section line caused the confusion in this case. It would be bad precedent for this
Court to condone the government's misrepresentation, albeit innocently mistaken,
by holding otherwise. The project completion rule promotes judicial economy
and certainty, which benefits all parties involved in a takings case.

Id. at 144 (underlining added).
In this case the facts present similar ripeness and policy considerations found in C&G and
provide compelling reasons for this Court to depart from the Tibbs standard and adopt a tolling
standard like the construction completion rule to multi-phase projects. Like C&G, Buckskin's
damages would be speculative because it cannot know what each fee assessment will cost until it
actually files for Final Plat on each of its phases. There are two reasons why damages are
speculative. First, Buckskin will not know how many building lots it will actually include for
construction in each phase until it actually seeks Final Plat approval.

The number of lots

included in a phase may be dictated by a number of factors, but it is not an exactly known
quantity at the time the CUP was approved. Since Valley County's road impact fee is calculated
based on the number of lots in a phase, damages are purely speculative until final plat approval is
sought and the exact number of lots is determined.
Secondly, and more significantly, Valley County has demonstrated by its own actions in
this case that damages are purely speculative until Final Plat approval is sought by a developer.
At the commencement of construction for Phase 1 of The Meadows Subdivision, Valley County
identified a per lot road impact fee of$1,844. R. Vol. II, p. 338. When Buckskin applied for and
received final plat approval for Phases 2 and 3 of The Meadows and entered into a new RDA
with Valley County, the per lot road impact fee was again calculated at $1,844. R. Vol. II, p.
349. As Buckskin began preparations to obtain final plat approval for Phases 4 through 6 of The
Meadows Subdivision, it was informed that Valley County had unilaterally and without notice
increased the per lot road impact fee to $3,968. This represents a more than two fold increase in
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the road impact fee. See R. Vol. II, p. 351; R. Vol. II, p. 280,

~~

14-17; R. Vol. II, p. 250,

~~

5-8;

R. Vol. II, p. 255, ~~ 4-5.
Buckskin's damages for inverse condemnation on Phases 2 and 3 were speculative until it
was required to actually pay the road impact fees, and remain speculative for the future phases of
The Meadows. The evidence in the record also establishes that the road impact fees exacted
from developers by Valley County may unilaterally increase at the County's whim without
notice. Not only is this egregiously unfair, it more than illustrates the speculative nature of
Buckskin's inverse condemnation damages before Final Plat approval was (or is) sought and the
road impact fee was actually paid.
Public policy considerations in this case also compel departure from the Tibbs standard.
Like C&G, Buckskin was mislead into believing that Valley County could collect an impact fee.
The County's ordinance (i.e. the LUDO) governing applications for planned unit developments
states that the County can impose impact fees. Specifically, Section I and J of Appendix C of the
LUDO requires the payment of impact fees. R. Vol. II, p. 280, 298. Additionally, prior to
Buckskin filing this lawsuit, at least one sitting Valley County Commissioner, during a public
hearing on September 28, 2009, expressed serious doubts about the legality of Valley County's
CIP/Road Development Agreements by stating:
. .. we have been working under an understanding which has been proven to be
incorrect, legally incorrect, on our road development agreements. And we need to
make a change. We need to make a change if we're going to continue those and
we need to be in compliance with Idaho state law if we're going to continue road
agreements, road fees, whatever you want to call them, we need to be in
compliance with Idaho state law.
And in order to be there, under today's Idaho state law we have to adopt impact
fees at least ....
Villegas Affidavit, Ex D (Deposition of Frank W. Eld), p. 55, 1. 25 - p. 56, 1. 12.

This

Commissioner also testified that Valley County had two legal opinions that the Road
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Development Agreement method of raising funds violated Idaho law. Jd., at p. 62,1. 23 - p. 63,

1. 25.
Although the LUDO states that impact fees can be collected, the County admits that it
never enacted an ID IF A compliant impact fee ordinance. R. VoL I, p. 33. This further provides
a policy basis for departing from the Tibbs standard in this case. Not only did Valley County's
LUDO incorrectly state that impact fees can be collected, Valley County continued its illegal
scheme by adopting a uniform practice of conditioning approval of Final Plat upon applicants
entering into a RDA. Now, the County uses that fact to fabricate a defense that the fees were
paid were voluntary and hence not a taking.

The affidavits submitted by Buckskin

representatives, the affidavits from other developers, deposition testimony from current and
former county commissioners and the County's very own Master Transportation Plan all point to
the fact that impact fee payments were required. See Statement of Facts, supra.
IV.

Did the district court err in holding Resolution 11-6 mooted Appellant Buckskin's
request for declaratory relief?

Valley County's Resolution 11-6 does not moot Buckskin's request for a declaratory
judgment that it does not have to pay a road impact fee for Phases 4, 5, and 6 of The Meadows.
The Board of County Commissioners of Valley County approved Resolution 11-6 on March 7,
2011, well over a year after Buckskin initiated this legislation. Resolution 11-6 is a misguided
attempt to moot Buckskin's claims related to future phases of The Meadows Subdivision. Based
on the nature of a resolution and the very language of Resolution 11-6, the district court erred in
ruling that Buckskin's claims related to its future phases were moot.
Resolution 11-6 purports to place a moratorium on Valley County's road development
fee program and RDA requirement. R. Vol. III, p. 55l. For those developers that have yet to
enter into an RDA, Section 2 of Resolution 11-6 requires applicants to either voluntarily pay
road impact fees until Valley County adopts an IDIFA-compliant ordinance or to negotiate
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RDA's with the County, reservmg to Valley County the unilateral authority to deny an
application based on its inability to secure funding under its CIP. R. Vol. III, p. 552-53. For
existing RDA's, under Section 4 of Resolution 11-6, developers have an opportunity to
voluntarily pay a fee, put the development on hold, or negotiate a new RDA. R. Vol. III, p. 553.
If an IDIF A-compliant ordinance is not in place, Valley County:
will seek other ways to meet its obligation to ensure that adequate public services
are available to serve the new development. This could include conditions
respecting the sequence and timing of development so as to ensure that
development occur [sic] on a schedule consistent with the availability of public
serVIces.
R. Vol. III, p. 553.

As part of its Complaint, Buckskin requested a declaratory judgment that Valley
County's practice of requiring developers to pay impact fees is in violation of Idaho law and is
invalid. R. Vol. I, p. 4. After the district court issued its initial Memorandum Decision, Valley
County filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment on January 13, 2011, asking the district court to
dismiss Buckskin's Complaint with prejudice. R. Vol. III, p. 498. Buckskin objected to this
motion on grounds that the district court's Memorandum Decision did not dispose of all the
claims raised in its Complaint, including Buckskin's claim for declaratory relief that it did not
have to pay impact fees for the final phases. R. Vol. III, p. 510. On March 9, 2011, Valley
County replied to Buckskin's objection, in part, on grounds that Resolution 11-6, adopted two
days earlier, rendered Buckskin's claims moot. R. Vol. III, pp. 540, 548, Ex. 1. A hearing was
held two days later, on March 11, 2011, which included arguments related to the newly adopted
Resolution 11-6. The district court agreed and entered judgment on behalf of Valley County,
dismissing Buckskin's entire Complaint with prejudice.
In ruling against Buckskin on Valley County's Motion for Entry of Judgment, the district
court found that Resolution 11-6 mooted Buckskin's declaratory judgment claims for the future
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phases of The Meadows Subdivision because Buckskin now has a chance under Resolution 11-6
to negotiate a RDA for phases 4-6 of The Meadows. R. Vol. III, p. 579-80. The district court
erred in its ruling with regard to the effect of Resolution 11-6 because Resolution 11-6 is an
improper method to address the illegal impact fee issue, Valley County has no authority to
require Buckskin to negotiate a RDA for the remaining phases of The Meadows Subdivision, and
any claim for the future yet-to-be completed phases of The Meadows are now improperly
subjected to the res judicata effect of the district court's entry of judgment.
A.

Resolution 11-6 does not moot Buckskin's claim for a declaratory
judgment in relation to the future phases of its development because the
ordinances requiring the payment of an illegal impact fee remain in force.

Though Valley County clearly adopted Resolution 11-6 in response to this litigation, it
does not moot Buckskin's claim for a declaratory judgment related to the development of future
phases of The Meadows Subdivision. Resolution 11-6 is just that, a resolution. It does not
create any binding authority on Valley County and may be revoked or withdrawn as quickly and
as easily as it was adopted. If anything, the facts of this case and the timing of adoption of this
resolution suggest that it was passed merely to create a mootness argument. As set forth below,
Resolution 11-6 does not moot Buckskin's request for declaratory relief that it does not have to
pay an impact fee or otherwise mitigate for traffic impacts on Phases 4, 5, and 6 of The
Meadows.

Further, under IDIFA an ordinance is the only allowed method for placing any

requirement for the payment of impact fees on a land use applicant.
A government body generally may act by ordinance or resolution unless a particular
mode of action is required by constitution or statute.

Snake River Homebuilders Assn. v.

Caldwell, 101 Idaho 47, 48, 607 P.2d 1321, 1322 (1980).

Regardless, a resolution is very

different from an ordinance. A resolution is a mere expression of opinion of the governing body
and, unlike an ordinance, is not a law. See City a/Salisbury v. Nagel, 420 S.W.2d 37 (Kans. Ct.

APPELLANTS'BRlEF-23

App. 1967) (citing 37 Am.

JUL

Municipal Corporations s 142; 62 CJ.S. Municipal Corporations

s 411; Vol. 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, s 15.02; Baker v. Lake City Sewer Dist., 30
Wash.2d 510,191 P.2d 844).
Under ID IF A, Valley County is required to enact an ordinance to collect impact fees.
I.C § 67-8207. Thus a particular mode of action is required under Idaho law to address the
payment of any impact fee. Resolution 11-6 remains nothing more than an attempt by Valley
County to circumvent the requirements of IDIFA. Under its own terms, continued development
will be allowed in Valley County only if the developer expressly volunteers to pay road impact
fees or if the County decides to allow the development nonetheless. Valley County ominously
reserves to itself the right to either deny an application based on its inability to obtain funds
under its CIP or to dictate the timing and sequence of development. This is simply not allowed
by IDIF A. Resolution 11-6 cannot be used to avoid the requirements of IDIF A.
Further, the provisions of the County's LUDO and CIP scheme remain in place. Valley
County has admitted that it has not enacted an IDIF A compliant ordinance, nor has it taken any
steps to do so. Therefore, Sections I and J of Appendix C to Valley County's LUDO requiring
the payment of impact fees through a development agreement or otherwise is illegal. None of
the controlling legal mechanisms have changed, been abolished, or replaced with an ordinance
compliant with the IDIFA. As for Buckskin, Valley County's future enactment of an IDIFAcompliant ordinance is of little relevance because it is the ordinances in place at the time of the
application that apply, not a future IDIFA-compliant ordinance. See South Fork Coalition v. Bd

of Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857, 861, 792 P.2d 882, 886 (1990) (holding that
an applicant's rights are determined by the ordinances in place at the time of the application).
The enactment of an ID IF A -compliant ordinance is irrelevant to Buckskin's existing CUP.
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Thus, Valley County leaves itself with the same power to deny Buckskin final plat
approval if Buckskin refuses to "voluntarily" pay an illegal impact fee for road development
purposes.

Resolution 11-6 does not answer the problem or moot the issue.

Buckskin was

entitled to a declaration voiding the offending ordinance provisions in the LUDO as well as a
declaration that it did not have to pay impact fees for the final phases of The Meadows.
B.

Valley County does not have legal authority to require Buckskin to enter
into a Road Development Agreement under Resolution 11-6.

Valley County has limited authority to require a developer to enter into a road
development agreement. Resolution 11-6 still requires Buckskin to negotiate for a RDA in order
to proceed with development of future phases of The Meadows. Valley County, however, has no
authority under Idaho law to require Buckskin to negotiate or enter into a development
agreement of any kind outside the context of a rezone of property. Under the Local Land Use
Planning Act ("LLUP A"), a governmental body is granted the authority to require an applicant to
enter into a development agreement only if the application requests a re-zoning of the subject
property. Section 67-6511A of LLUPA, entitled "Development Agreements," states, in relevant
part: "[ e]ach governing board may, by ordinance adopted or amended in accordance with the
notice and hearing provisions provided under section 67-6509, Idaho Code, require or permit ~

a condition o(rezoning that an owner or developer make a written commitment concerning the
use or development of the subject parcel." I.C. § 67-6511 A (emphasis added).
There was no rezone as a part of Buckskin's application. Buckskin applied for a Planned
Unit Development and Conditional Use Permit, not a rezone. The County has no authority under
Resolution 11-6 to require a party to negotiate or enter into a development agreement outside of
circumstances where a request for a rezone is included in the application. The district court erred
in concluding that Buckskin even "negotiate" a new development agreement because Valley
County has no authority to require Buckskin to negotiate for and enter into a development
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agreement of any kind. Further related to this, it is highly questionable what, exactly, will be the
subject of any such development agreement aside from the payment of road impact fees. The
RDA's required by Valley County prior to Resolution 11-6 dealt solely with the payment of road
development fees. See R. Vol. 1, p. 123; R. Vol. I, p. 169; R. Vol. I, p. 178; R. Vol. I, p. 181; R.
Vol. I, p. 194; R. Vol. I, p. 204; R. Vol. I, p. 221; R. Vol. II, p. 273; R. Vol. II, p. 334; R. Vol. II,
p. 344; R. Vol. II, p. 394; R. Vol. II, p. 404.
Resolution 11-6 essentially states that payment of such fees will be required for approval
of any application due to the alleged impacts of the development. Otherwise it is entirely unclear
what exactly developers have to negotiate with Valley County in relation to a road development
agreement besides the payment of a road impact fee. Valley County has no legal authority to
require Buckskin to negotiate a RDA under Resolution 11-6.
C.

Dismissing Buckskin's Complaint with prejudice leaves Buckskin without
the possibility of redress for any violation of the law with regard to the
future phases of its development.

Valley County has preserved to itself all the necessary power under Resolution 11-6 to
mandate or require the payment of an impact fee as a condition to approval of a land use
application or approval of final plat by maintaining, under Sections 2 and 4, the right to deny
applications based on impacts or the right to control the timing and sequence of development.
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Buckskin is entitled to a declaration that Valley County's
road development fee and its ordinances and programs requiring payment of road development
fees are invalid under the law, even if no other relief is available to Buckskin. I.C. § 10-1212;
See also Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 773, 133 P.3d 1232, 1238 (2006) (holding that a

declaratory action is appropriate if it will clarify and settle the legal relations at issue, if such
declaration will afford relief from uncertainty and controversy giving rise to the proceeding, and
if deferring adjudication would add nothing to the legal issues presented); See also Ayers v.
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General Hospital, 67 Idaho 430,434, 182 P.2d 958,959 (1947) (recognizing that a declaratory
action is appropriate to invoke remedial or preventative relief, or for a potential threat).
Resolution 11-6 is subject to change at Valley County's whim. The County may revise
Resolution 11-6 or it may withdraw it altogether. It is nothing more than an expression of the
County Commissioner's opinion or mind with regard to Valley County's impact fee scheme.
Despite the representations made in Resolution 11-6, there is absolutely no assurance that
Buckskin's rights will not be impacted with regard to the development of future phases of The
Meadows. The discussion above regarding Valley County's unilateral and arbitrary increase of
the road impact fee by more than double between Phases 2 and 3 and Phases 4 to 6 of The
Meadows is a perfect illustration of why it is necessary for Buckskin to obtain a declaratory
judgment that Valley County's LUDO and CIP are illegal under Idaho law. Valley County's
further hedging on whether it will actually follow Idaho law and adopt an IDIF A-compliant
impact fee ordinance further illustrates Buckskin's need for a declaratory judgment with regard
to the future phases of its development and whether Valley County's current impact fee scheme
and program is illegal under Idaho law.
For all of these reasons, the district court erred in granting Valley County's Motion for
entry of judgment and in entering judgment on behalf of Valley County and dismissing all of
Buckskin's claims with prejudice.

Resolution 11-6 does not moot Buckskin's claim for

declaratory judgment in this case.

v.

Did the district court err in dismissing Appellant Buckskin's illegal fee/tax claim on
summary judgment?
Valley County's CIP and LUDO provisions requiring the payment of road development

fees is an impact fee scheme and constitutes an unauthorized and illegal fee or tax because
Valley County has not followed the requirements under the enabling statutes ofIDIFA necessary
to collect impact fees.
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In Count One of its Complaint, Buckskin requested a declaratory

judgment that Valley County's road impact fee scheme is an unauthorized and illegal fee or tax
because Valley County has not enacted an ordinance to collect impact fees under IDIFA. R. Vol.
I, pp. 4-5. The District Court essentially agreed with Buckskin, finding in its Memorandum
Decision Re: Summary Judgment that: "[h]ere Plaintiffs had no obligation to pay the impact fees
under protest in order to recover them later because Valley County did not have the authority to
impose the impact fees as Valley County had not complied with the procedures set forth in I.C. §
67-8206." R. Vol. III, p. 492.
Based on the District Court's finding and because Valley County's Motion for Summary
Judgment only addressed Count Two of Buckskin's Complaint for its claim of inverse
condemnation, Buckskin moved for partial summary judgment on Count I of its Complaint that
the RDA fee constitutes an unauthorized impact fee and/or illegal tax. R. Vol. III, p. 494.
Buckskin again raised the issue of its unadjudicated illegal fee and tax claim in objecting to
Valley County's Motion for Entry of Judgment, which sought to dismiss all of Buckskin's claims
with prejudice. R. Vol. III, p. 510. During the district court's March 11,2011 hearing on the
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Buckskin's counsel again raised the issue of Buckskin's
illegal fee and tax claim against Valley County. Tf. Vol. I, p. 2, L. 17 - p. 5, L. 2.
The district court denied Buckskin's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I
on grounds that: " ... the entire project was governed by a single Conditional Use Permit and at
the very latest, October 25,2004 was the date when the statute of limitations began to run on all
of the Plaintiffs' claims ... because ... it was at that point in time ... a substantial interference
with the Plaintiffs' property interest became apparent." R. Vol. III, p. 579. The District Court
held that: "October 25, 2004 was the latest point in time that the statute of limitations could have
began to run as a matter of law." Id.

Other than to recite the legal standard on which it

dismissed Buckskin's inverse condemnation claim, the district court provided no other analysis
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as to why Buckskin was not entitled to summary judgment on its illegal fee and tax declaratory
jUdgment claim despite the fact the district comi essentially agreed that Valley County's impact
fee ordinance is illegal.
The district court's ruling is in error with regard to Buckskin's claim for payment of an
illegal fee or tax. Buckskin's additional claim (i.e. declaration of illegal tax and violation of the
Idaho Development Impact Fee Act) is completely distinct, and must be addressed apart from the
inverse condemnation claim. The district court's ruling either ignores Count I of Buckskin's
Complaint or it subsumes Buckskin's illegal fee or tax claim within its inverse condemnation
claim, and assigns to the illegal fee or tax claim the same standard for accrual as for inverse
condemnation.
Buckskin's claim for a declaratory judgment that Valley County's RDA scheme and the
fee required under the RDA is an illegal fee or tax is wholly separate from Buckskin's claim for
inverse condemnation. In fact, the legal standard for accrual of an inverse condemnation claim
has no application to Buckskin's claim for payment of an illegal fee or tax. The correct standard
of accrual for an illegal fee or tax claim is the date upon which the illegal fee or tax was paid.
A.

Buckskin's claim for a declaratory judgment that the fee it paid under Valley
County's Road DevelopmentAgreement scheme is illegal is a separate claim
from its inverse condemnation claim.

That a claim to recover payment of an illegal and unauthorized fee is a separate and
distinct claim from a claim for inverse condemnation cannot be seriously disputed. This Court
long ago recognized that a claim for payment of an illegal tax in violation of the Idaho
Constitution is as an independent, stand-alone cause of action under Idaho law. In Brewster v.

City of Pocatello this Court overturned a city ordinance imposing a street maintenance and
restoration fee on owners of property abutting a public street. Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115
Idaho 502, 504-05, 768 P.2d 765, 767-78 (1988) (holding that the fee at issue was a revenue
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generating measure and constituted an unauthorized and illegal tax without specific statutory
authority to charge such a fee from the legislature). In BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of BOise,
this Court reviewed and invalidated a city liquor license transfer fee because the city had no
authority to impose such a fee. BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 357-58,
63 P.3d 482,483-84 (2003) (holding that any authority of a county to regulate a matter for which
the state constitution authorized the legislature to act must come from the legislature and the
relevant statutory authority did not grant the municipality the authority to impose this fee).
Likewise, in Idaho Building Contractors Association, Inc. v. City of Coeur d'Alene, this Court
struck down an impact fee required by the city for all new building permits because the fee was
imposed in violation of IDIF A. Idaho Building Contractors Association, Inc. v. City of Coeur
d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995) (finding that IDIFA is the only enabling statute

permitting the collection of an impact fee and absent an IDIF A compliant ordinance the building
permit fee is a non-individual assessed tax).
As these cases demonstrate, a claim against a government entity to recover the payment
of an illegal and unauthorized fee or tax is clearly a recognized and accepted cause of action
under Idaho law. Buckskin pleaded a claim for illegal fee or tax as an alternative to its inverse
condemnation claim. This is allowable under the applicable rules and law. "Under modern
pleading rules parties may seek alternative or different types of relief regardless of consistency or
whether based on legal or equitable grounds or both." MK Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho
345, 350, 612 P.2d 1192, 1197 (1980). Modern pleading rules merely require a simple and
concise statement of the operative facts upon which relief may be granted on any sustainable
theory and regardless of consistency. Id. (citing Bernstein v.
1958)).

u.s., 256 F.2d 697, 706 (1oth Cir.

Several legal theories for recovery may draw upon the same core set facts.

See

Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (1987)
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(acknowledging that plaintiffs in the case pleaded alternative claims based on several different
legal theories). Certainly each legal theory is unique and each legal theory is subject to separate
elements of proof and accrual triggers for statute of limitations purposes.
This is illustrated in the case of Intermountain West, Inc. v. City of Boise, III Idaho 878,
728 P.2d 767 (1986). In that case Intermountain West, Inc. began developing land that was
subsequently annexed into Boise city limits. Id. at 878, 728 P.2d at 767. The City posted a stop
work order because Intermountain West had not obtained building permits from the City after
annexation of the property. Id. After the stop work orders were ignored, the City sought an
injunction to stop the construction. Id. The court ruled in favor of Intermountain West on a
vested rights theory and the City appealed. Id. at 879, 729 P.2d at 768. After that appeal,
Intermountain West sued Boise City for damages caused by issuance of the stop work order and
for inverse condemnation.

Id.

While both claims were dismissed as untimely, this Court

reviewed each claim separately and identified different accrual dates for each claim. The tort
cause of action accrued on September 3, 1975, because that was the date the stop work orders
were lifted. Id. The inverse condemnation claim, on the other hand, accrued on a different date,
no later than July 30, 1975, because that was the date the plaintiffs loss of its property became
apparent. Id. at 880, 729 P.2d at 769.
The distinction between Buckskin's claims and the required proof for each claim further
illustrates the district court's error in dismissing Buckskin's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. The Idaho Constitution states that private property may be taken by the government
for a public use, "but not until ajust compensation" has been paid for the property. Idaho Const.
Art. 1, § 14. Thus the government's taking of private property for public use is not the conduct

that violates the Idaho Constitution, but rather, it is the taking without the payment of just
compensation.

The Idaho Constitution is clear that the remedy is the payment of just
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compensation, not declaratory relief preventing the taking of private property.

Buckskin's

request for declaratory relief that the fee collected under the RDA, on the other hand, will require
evidence that Valley County engaged in an ultra vires act in violation of IDIFA. This proof must
come by way of a declaratory action- an action that is separate from an inverse condemnation
action.
As illustrated by Intermountain West, Inc. v. City of Boise, a plaintiff may plead
alternative theories for recovery, each of which is governed by different elements of proof and a
distinct standard for triggering accrual of the statute of limitation. The district court's analysis
that all Buckskin's claims, without regard to the nature of the claim or the elements of proof,
accrued as of October 25,2004 because the entire PUD was approved under one conditional use
permit was in error. Buckskin's declaratory judgment claim for an unauthorized and illegal fee
or tax is a separate, alternative claim from its inverse condemnation claim and cannot be
dismissed on the same procedural grounds the district court applied to Buckskin's inverse
condemnation claim.
B.

The correct standard for accrual of the statute of limitations for a claim to
recover payment of an unauthorized and illegal tax is the date the illegal tax
is paid.

There is no Idaho law assigning the test for accrual of an inverse condemnation claim to a
claim against a government entity for the imposition of an unauthorized and illegal fee or tax,
which is a separate and distinct cause of action from inverse condemnation. The district court
further erred in assessing whether Buckskin's illegal fee or tax claim was timely under the same
standard applied to Buckskin's inverse condemnation claim. The fact that this case happens to
involve a land use application for a PUD that was granted under a single conditional use permit
is not relevant. An illegal tax claim is not an inverse condemnation claim and the triggering
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event for accrual of the statute of limitations for an illegal tax claim is clearly different than the
standard that must be applied to a claim for inverse condemnation.
The appropriate standard for the triggering or accrual of a claim for the payment of an
unauthorized and illegal fee/tax is the date upon which the claimant was made to pay the fee.
Though an Idaho court has not ruled on this question specifically, many other courts have. For
example, in Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 746 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 2001), the Illinois
Supreme Court set the accrual date for payment of an illegal impact fee claim as the date the
claimant paid the fee. Id. at 262. In that case, Sundance Homes, Inc., a developer, sued DuPage
County for a declaratory judgment to return the road impact fee it paid under the County's road
impact fee ordinance after the enabling statute was determined unconstitutional under Illinois
law. Id. at 257. The developer argued that its cause of action did not accrue until the Illinois
Supreme Court ruled the enabling statute unconstitutional.

Id. at 258. After reviewing the

underlying legal policy for a statute of limitations and what events trigger a statute of limitations,
the court held that the event triggering the statute of limitations for a declaratory judgment claim
to return payment of an illegal fee is the date the fee was paid. Id. at 262.
In Lowenberg v. Dallas, 168 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2005), the Texas Supreme Court likewise
addressed the issue of when a claim for the payment of an illegal fee is triggered for statute of
limitations purposes. In Lowenberg, the ordinance at issue required commercial property owners
to pay a "fire registration fee." Id. at 801. The claimant sued the city alleging that the fee was an
illegal tax. Id. The lower court agreed and the city appealed on grounds that the statute of
limitations had expired because it accrued on the date the city passed the ordinance. Id.
The Texas Supreme Court held that a claim to recover payment of an illegal fee charged
by a government entity accrues on the date when the payment is made. Id. The Court stated that
under Texas law the applicable statute of limitations was the same statute of limitations as for a
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takings claim. Id. at 802. In setting the accrual date, the Court compared a regulatory taking to a
physical taking and the distinct accrual dates for those distinct claims. ld. The Court reasoned
that a claim for the payment of an illegal or unauthorized fee, as with a physical taking, is
triggered on the date the fee was paid because that is the point in time the claimant is deprived of
its money and the point in time at which the claimant suffers a wrong or an injury allowing the
claimant to sue to recover. ld. Mere enactment of the ordinance, or some other arbitrary date
prior to the actual payment of the illegal fee, does not harm or injure the claimant. ld. It is
payment of the fee that causes the harm. ld.
This rule is consistent with what other state and federal courts have identified as the
accrual date for a claim to recover the payment of an illegal and unauthorized fee. In Kuhn v.
Department of Revenue, 897 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1995) the Colorado Supreme Court held that a

claim to recover the payment of an illegal tax accrues when the tax is paid, independently of the
claimant's knowledge of an injury. Id. at 797. In Paul v. City of Winsoocket, 745 A.2d 169 (R.I.
2000), the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that a claim for the payment of an illegal water
connection impact fee accrued, and the statute of limitations began ticking, as of the date the
claimant paid the illegal fee because that was the date the claimant suffered an injury. ld. at 171.
In Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of La Habra, 23 P.3d 601 (Cal. 2001), the
California Supreme Court likewise concluded that in a case to recover ongoing payments for
utility assessments that arose from an illegal tax, the claim accrued each time the fee was
collected. Id. at 602. In the case of Venture Coal Sales Company v. Us., 370 FJd 1102 (Fed.
Cir. 2004), the court ruled that a claim for recovery of payment of an illegal sales tax accrued
when payment for the sales tax was remitted to the federal government. Id. at 1105.
These holdings are in line with the views of this Court with regard to the accrual or
triggering of the statute of limitations. This Court has been more than clear that accrual does not
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occur until damages are incurred: " ... we have never held that a statute of limitations may run
before an aggrieved party suffers damages. The authority to do so is highly doubtful, since it is
axiomatic that a party has no right to sue for damages until actual injury occurs. Corbridge v.
Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 88-89, 730 P.2d 1005, 1008-09 (1986). This is further in line

with the "some damage" standard, which this Court has also applied to the question of accrual
for a claim under Idaho Code section 5-224. See Jones v. RunJt, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews,
Chtd, 125 Idaho 607 873 P.2d 601 (1994) (applying the "some damage" standard to a claim

under Idaho Code section 5-224 for breach of a fiduciary duty claim). As with a claim to recover
the payment of an illegal tax, a party cannot incur "some damage" until it is made to pay the fee
that is an illegal tax.
In this case, Buckskin's claim for a declaratory judgment that Valley County's RDA
scheme is an unauthorized and illegal fee or tax did not accrue until it was required to pay the
illegal fee. It is not relevant that Buckskin's project involved one conditional use permit. Each
phase required final plat approval by the Valley County Commissioners. Payment of the illegal
impact fee was a condition of, and occurred at, final plat approval for each subsequent phase of
the development. Buckskin suffered no harm or injury, and had no right to seek redress for
payment of the illegal fee, until each time it paid the illegal fee. Setting the accrual date for an
illegal fee claim as the date the illegal fee is paid provides a date certain that comports with the
underlying policy that an injury has not occurred, and a claim has not arisen, until the party
suffers damages. The arbitrary "made aware of a substantial interference" standard applicable to
inverse condemnation claims is simply unwarranted in the context of a claim to recover the
payment of an illegal fee or tax. Aside from the fact that these are distinct claims with distinct
elements of proof, in the context of an illegal fee/tax claim there is no question as to when the
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claimant has suffered damages. The illegal fee or tax is paid on a date certain. There is no place
for an arbitrary standard for accrual when damages arise from a single, specified event.
Applying the test for accrual for an inverse condemnation claim to an illegal tax claim
would lead to an absurd result. Passage of an ordinance to collect puts the public on notice of the
requirements of the ordinance. In the case of an ordinance requiring payment of an unauthorized
fee or tax, such notice does not mean the offending ordinance is made enforceable against all
persons who did not bring a lawsuit within the statute of limitations based on the mere passage of
time. Rather, the offended party must suffer some damage or some harm by being made to pay
the illegal tax. Otherwise, an ordinance requiring the payment of an unauthorized fee or tax
becomes, in effect, "legal" after the passage of time simply because nobody sued within the
limitations period. This cannot be, and is not, the law with regard to the question of when a
claim to recover payment of an illegal fee or tax accrues. The claim accrues upon the payment
of the illegal fee or tax because that is when the party paying the illegal fee or tax suffers an
injury or some damage.
VI.

Did the district court err in refusing to apply the five-year statute of limitations in
this case to a claim based upon a written instrument?

Buckskin's claim in Count I of its Complaint is for a declaratory judgment that Valley
County's RDA's requiring payment of impact fees are illegal contracts and void because Valley
County uses the agreements to circumvent Idaho law on impact fees. See R. Vol. I, p. 2. The
Road Development Agreement is a written contract. The applicable statute of limitations for a
dispute involving a written agreement states that "[a]n action upon any contract, obligation or
liability founded upon an instrument in writing must be brought: "[w]ithin five (5) years." I.C. §
5-216. The district court indicated in footnote 1 of its Memorandum Decision that the five year
statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-216 is inapplicable to Buckskin's claims

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 36

because there has been no claim for breach of contract and there is no evidence in the record of a
breach of contract. R. VoL III, p. 491.
The five-year limitations period under Idaho Code section 5-216 is not limited to breach
of contract claims. The limitations period applies to any action founded upon an instrument in
writing.

In this case Buckskin sought a declaratory judgment that Valley County cannot

"circumvent Idaho law by forcing developers to pay momes under the gUIse of a Road
Development Agreement and/or Capital Contribution Agreement." R. Vol. I, p. 5. The very
mechanism by which the impact fee was paid was a contract.

The UnifOlID Declaratory

Judgment Act sets no statute of limitation itself. Therefore, the five-year statute of limitations
for an action founded upon a written instrument applies. See I.C. § 5-201. For this additional
reason the district court erred in dismissing Buckskin's Complaint.
In denying the Motion for Reconsideration on this same issue, the district court further
determined that Buckskin's assertion of the five year statute of limitations was "without merit
because this is simply not an action based on a contract." R. VoL III, p. 581. As stated directly
above, it was by way of a written contract that Valley County required the payment of an impact
fee. If it is determined that Valley County cannot circumvent IDIF A by means of a written
contract to collect impact fees, all contracts entered into under that scheme are illegal. Hence,
money collected under that contract in the form of impact fees should be returned to the
developer. See Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State Dept. of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 668, 52
P.3d 307, 312 (2002) (Idaho law recognizes rescission as an equitable remedy that totally
abrogates the contract and seeks to restore the parties to their original position prior to the
contract).
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VII.

Is Appellant Buckskin entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal?
Buckskin requests an award of attorney fees on appeal based on Idaho Code Sections 12-

117, and 12-121.
Idaho Code Section 12-117 provides in a judicial proceeding involving a governmental
entity such as Valley County, the prevailing party is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney
fees if the Court finds that the other party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The
purpose of this statute is: (1) to deter arbitrary or groundless action by the government agency;
and (2) to provide a remedy for financial burdens attempting to correct mistakes made by the
governmental agency. Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118,90
P.3d 340, 343 (2004). A party acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law only when the
party's pursuit of its claims is frivolous, without foundation or unreasonable.

Karr v.

Bermeosolo, 142 Idaho 444,449, 129 P.3d 88, 93 (2005). Where the requirements of I.C. § 12117 are met, an award of attorney fees is mandatory, not discretionary. Rincover v. State of

Idaho, Dep't of Finance, 132 Idaho 547,549,976 P.2d 473,475 (1999).
Likewise, I.e. § 12-121 permits an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party is entitled
to an award of attorney fees only when a claim is pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably
or without merit. I.e. § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). However, unlike Idaho Code 12-117 an
attorney's fees award under section 12-121 is discretionary on the court. Chisholm v. Twin Falls

County, 139 Idaho 131, 136,75 P.2d 185, 190 (2003).
In this case, attorney fees on appeal are awardable under I.C. §§ 12-117 and 12-121
because there is no basis in law for the County to collect impact fees in derogation of IDIFA's
requirements. The County's LUDO references the ability to collect an impact fee on Planned
Unit Developments. R. Vol. II, p. 290. Further, the County has already admitted that it has not
enacted an IDIFA compliant ordinance.
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R. Vol. I, p. 33.

Even Valley County's Master

Transportation Plan reveals that the County's program was intended to collect impact fees.
Villegas Affidavit, Ex. E. These facts taken together should have been enough for the district
court to order that the offending provisions of the LUDO be stricken and declare that Buckskin
did not have to pay an impact fee on its final phases of The Meadows.
If this Court finds that the district court erroneously relied on the County's Resolution 116 to moot Buckskin's request for declaratory relief, then a finding should also be made that the
County had no basis in law to collect impact fees. Buckskin raised this issue in its Objection to
Valley County's Motion for Entry of Judgment, as well as its Motion for Reconsideration and
Memorandum in support of that motion. See R. Vol. III, pp. 510-522. Buckskin also filed its
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment CR. Vol. III, p. 494) on Count I of is Complaint because
the district court recognized that that County could not collect impact fees CR. Vol. III, p. 494).
Based on its arguments raised on appeal, Buckskin respectfully asks this Court to award attorney
fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Buckskin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
district court's judgment dismissing Buckskin's Complaint.
DATED this 21st day of November, 2011.
EV ANS KEANE

By
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